Urbanization effects on survey nonresponse: a test within and across cities

This paper addresses differences in survey response across city size by applying an explanation from House and Wolf to areas within cities. The data are from Toronto, Hamilton and Kitchener, in Canada. Consistent with other literature, response falls sharply from largest to smallest place, but variation in response rates within the cities is negligible. The intra-city analysis is accomplished by factor analyzing variables such as population density, crime rate and ethnic structure, mostly computed for census tracts, into a variable labelled social disorganization. What House and Wolf termed compositional variation in response is handled by record linking with municipal assessment information. The analysis is based on micro data taking the people listed for the sample as unit of observation.     

The transformational management of conflict: A perspective from the early Christian church

An understanding of transformational leadership has been developed for many spheres of management, but not previously for organizational conflict. This paper analyzes a successful conflict mediation attempt in the early Christian church and draws from it elements of a model of the transformational management of conflict that can be applied by managers in many contemporary work organizations. The elements include (a) reframing the conflict, (b) a focus on a shared organizational vision, (c) the placement of responsibility for dispute resolution in the hands of organizational members directly and indirectly involved in conflict, and (d) the use of communication devices consistent with the desired outcome. The paper suggests skills necessary for managers to implement the model and implications for research on it.     

Self-control in peer groups

Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals’ ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique “good news” equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique “bad news equilibrium” that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social interactions valuable only when they have enough confidence in their own and others’ ability to resist temptation. The ideal partner, however, is someone with a slightly worse self-control problem than one's own: this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures less discouraging.     

Organizational climate factors and the evaluation of technical ideas

Based on data obtained from 359 idea evaluators, canonical correlation analysis was used to examine the relationship between several organizational factors and a set of criteria used in the evaluation of technical ideas. In contrast to other studies, it was found that organizational factors—assessed in terms of organizational climate—could be explained in terms of two dimensions: organizational clarity and risk. Technical evaluation criteria could be explained in terms of professional self-gratification and organizational responsibility. In light of the multivariate relationship among the two sets of factors, a number of organizational design implications are outlined.     

Market Effects of Recognition and Disclosure

Our recognition and disclosure model reveals that price informativeness is determined by the interaction of the qualities of three information sources—the recognized amount, the disclosed information, and the information revealed by price—and accounting expertise acquisition. It also reveals that recognition of an accounting amount alters each of these, thereby affecting price informativeness. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that recognition of a highly unreliable accounting amount, rather than simply disclosing it, can result in greater price informativeness. Likewise, recognition of a highly reliable amount can result in lower price informativeness. Our findings suggest that, because of the effects of aggregation, basing recognition decisions on reliability alone is too simplistic. Reliability relative to relevance is key, not reliability per se. We also find that recognition and disclosure affect the coefficients in a regression of price on accounting amounts.     

Is there a pecking order? Evidence from a panel of IPO firms

We test the pecking order model of capital structure by examining the financing of firms that went public in 1983. We estimate a logit to predict external financing, and a multinomial logit to predict the type of financing using data on the IPO firms' security offerings during 1984–1992. Our results indicate that the probability of obtaining external funds is unrelated to the shortfall in internally generated funds, although firms with cash surpluses avoid external financing. Firms that access the capital markets do not follow the pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer.     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

The Future of Financial Reporting: Insights from Research

Research offers insights that, if heeded and built upon, could improve financial reporting, thereby contributing to a more prosperous society. In particular, research suggests improvement could stem from greater use of fair value; a performance statement designed to reveal the information embedded in changes in fair value; better information to help investors assess the value of intangible assets; more specific information about risk and uncertainty; information that is unbiased, rather than conservative; acceptance of a degree of earnings management together with a determination of how much earnings management is acceptable; and a financial reporting package designed to convey information users need, which presumably is broader than today's financial statements.     

Measurement of Quality of Life and Well‐Being in France: The Drivers of Subjective Well‐Being

Ever since the publication of the Stiglitz Report, France has been heavily involved in the measurement of well‐being. The French Statistical Institute (INSEE) has expanded the scope of its existing surveys. It has also launched an innovative experimental survey which, drawing upon a single statistical source, aims for the first time to explore the different dimensions of both objective and subjective quality of life, as highlighted in the Stiglitz Report. It allows us to study, at the individual level, correlations between these dimensions and the accumulation of deprivations. It has enabled us to better understand the links between determinants generally referred to as objective dimensions of quality of life (such as health or education) and subjective well‐being. This information is of paramount importance for policy makers who cannot act directly on the level of people's satisfaction but can only act upon the levers of objective dimensions. This paper presents the main findings of the experimental survey.     

Country asymmetry,trade agreements,and transfers

Using a standard 2 × 2 trade agreement model, I show that the welfare effects of a free trade agreement (FTA) depend on the asymmetry on supply and demand functions. When countries are sufficiently asymmetric with respect to the size or the demand functions, the small country tends to be better off, while the large country is worse off. Thus, the small country must compensate the large country for the FTA to be incentive‐compatible. However, in the presence of sufficient asymmetry in the supply functions, the small country is worse off, while the bigger is better off. In this case, the transfer must flow from the large to the small country. This last finding helps explain why some FTAs between rich and poor countries provide for adjustment transfers to the latter.